Last week saw the long overdue publication of the Makin Review - the Church of England's long running enquiry into its handling of allegations of abuse perpetrated by John Smyth within and around the Church of England. It is a report that shames many who failed to adequately respond to and support the Smyth's victims for over 40 years.
The report itself is comprehensive, detailing the nature of the abuse of up to 130 boys, precisely who knew what and when and what they did in response. Copies of correspondence between those 'in the know' from the early 1980s onwards are provided along with lengthy timelines and testimonies. The report itself is 250 pages long with hundreds more pages in appendices of additional details.
It is a very difficult read, with graphic and distressing details set out of the abuse that Smyth handed out. Long-term grooming of young boys of school age, sometimes over a period of many years, put Smyth in a position of total control over them. From this place he physically abused them with dreadful beatings in his soundproofed garden shed, dishing out hundreds of vicious lashes with a bamboo cane, undertaken with a veneer of spirituality which has left scars that will never truly heal.
There was an obvious element of sexual gratification involved, with much of the grooming centred on discussion of sexual sins and thoughts, including detailed conversations about masturbation, then the beating took place naked or semi-naked. Smyth would sometimes then caress and kiss necks and shoulders of the boys afterwards as they bled in his garden shed.
This is not the first report into Smyth's activities. As well as at Iwerne Camps, much of the grooming took place at Winchester College, one of the UK's most elite public boarding schools. The school
published its report into Smyth's abuse in 2022. That too was a sickening read, setting out not only how Smyth was allowed to gain unfettered access to the school via its Christian Fellowship, but how he gained the boys' trust and groomed them into his abusive behaviours.
Most disturbingly, it revealed that these behaviours became known to Winchester College in the early 1980s, but were not reported to the police. In fact, the College felt no obligation to tell the parents of children who were exposed to Smyth that reports of this behaviour had been received.
When read together, these two documents reveal a devastating dereliction of safeguarding duties by a large number of people and organisations. Most central to the story was the Iwirne Trust, who's leadership were given a very clear picture of Smyth's abuse as early as 1982 in the form of a detailed report by Mark Ruston, who was asked to interview victims and provide details. Ruston's view, expressed clearly in his report, was that Smyth's abuse constituted criminal activity.
A small group centred around David Fletcher and the leaders of the Iwerne Trust had extensive discussions with Smyth, Winchester College and others about the abuse and how to deal with it. None felt the need to tell parents of the victims, offer any practical support to victims, seek out other potential victims or inform the police of what they knew to be criminal activities. All discussions were held on condition of strict confidentiality.
Copies of correspondence by those 'in the know' are reproduced in the Makin report. They paint a shocking picture of a group primarily concerned with covering their own backs should the abuse become more widely known and protecting the reputation and ongoing work of Iwerne. In one awful symptomatic example, Alan Martin, Director of Scripture Union at the time, wrote to Rev John Eddison, one of the Iwerne leaders:
What does concern me slightly in your letter is the reference to parents and others who have apparently voiced suspicions to you in the past, and who were reassured by you that JS [John Smyth] was a person of complete integrity. I am sure that this was said in complete good faith, and it is of course easy to be wise after the event; but I do just wonder if some of the queries should have been followed up, as of course any hint of the type of problems we are talking about in the Iwerne context could be fairly lethal. (Makin report p.102)
One assumes that Martin thought the allegations could be lethal to Iwerne rather the the victims, some of whom we know to have attempted suicide. The neglect of consideration for victims is almost beyond belief.
In other correspondence, Eddison discussed a meeting with several Iwerne leaders where they consider who they should tell about the abuse to 'completely cover ourselves against any charge of secretiveness' if it should become more widely known. This would mean, "someone will be able to say 'I was told all about it, because [Iwerne leaders] felt someone in authority should know, but I was asked not to say anything for the sake of the young men concerned.' (Makin report p.109).
The pattern is consistent - cover our own backs and try to keep the whole thing quiet.
The Makin report names numerous senior Evangelical leaders outside the core Iwerne leadership who knew, such as David McInnes, formerly of St Aldate's Oxford, Hugh Palmer, formerly of All Souls Langham Place, and Jonathan Fletcher, formerly of Emmanual Wimbledon. Those named in the report form a Who's Who of conservative evangelicalism of the period, many of whom were hugely influential for decades. Many more were informed of Smyth's abuse to varying degrees of formality and detail. None made a referral to the police. None acted to prevent future abuse from happening, something which tragically came to pass after Smyth moved to Zimbabwe in 1984 then later South Africa following his removal from positions at Iwerne and Winchester College.
The recent headlines have focused on the period from 2013 to 2017 in particular since this was the time when allegations about Smyth's abuse became known to the Church of England. Makin concludes that the response was incompetent (many believed that a referral to the police had taken place when it had not) and inadequate in failing to follow up on referrals to the Diocese in South Africa where Smyth remained active. Most painfully, the response and support offered to victims was woeful.
The Archbishop of Canterbury himself was criticised. While he was told that no more needed to be done as a referral to the police had taken place and the authorities in South Africa alerted, the Archbishop did not follow these up or assure himself that this was the case. While clear that Justin Welby did not fail in a legal or procedural obligation, the report is equally clear that he had a moral obligation. In response, the Archbishop has said in an interview that he considered resigning, but on the advice of colleagues has decided not to. When Newman asked if his failures were incompetence rather than cover up, Welby answered "yes".
Things began to change in 2017 when the allegations were featured on Channel 4 News, although the response to victims continued to be disjointed, confusing and inadequate. Nevertheless, a police investigation was finally opened, although Smyth's death in 2018 meant he evaded justice.
Others will be better placed than Mouse to go through the details of the Makin Report, alongside Winchester College's report, to work out what needs to change. Makin makes a number of recommendations and they must be taken very seriously.
However, it is important to understand what this report is, and what it is not. It is a detailed account of John Smyth's abuse and how the Church of England responded to it. It is not an overview of the Church of England's safeguarding standards and processes, its culture or an investigation into the lessons learned from other recent safeguarding cases.
This explains some major omissions from the report. Most obvious is a fact that lies only just below the surface - that Smyth's abuse took place in a startlingly similar manner to the abuse perpetrated by another senior evangelical leader within Smyth's close circle - Jonathan Fletcher. Fletcher is now awaiting trial for sexual assault, so the full details of his abuse are not yet known. However, the safeguarding charity Thirtyone:Eight
conducted a review on behalf of Emmanuel Wimbledon which set out some accounts from Fletcher's victims.
Fletcher too developed coercive and abusive relationships with young men and undertook naked massages and smacking, albeit seemingly less brutally than Smyth. The Thirtyone:Eight report concludes that Fletcher's abuse was known about by leaders at Emmanuel Church, Wimbledon, before they became more widely known in 2017 but that "little or no action was taken to address this by role holders and leaders at ECW at the time."
It is almost beyond comprehension that two such abuse cases have emerged from within such a small circle and that both cases were known by leaders around them. In fact, Makin describes Smyth's abuse as 'a very open secret indeed'. It is also incredible to Mouse that Makin does not explicitly mention the fact that the central figure in the mismanagement and cover-up of Smyth's abuse, David Fletcher, was Jonathan's brother. Jonathan Fletcher is mentioned on numerous occasions in the Makin report, including accounts that he was fully aware of the nature of Smyth's abuse and involved in discussions on how to handle the situation with his brother and other Iwerne leaders. However, there is no mention that he himself was an abuser.
There is just one hint at the fact in Makin's report:
At this time and with breathtaking hypocrisy, John Smyth warned a victim of another individual, Jonathan Fletcher. He said to him that it was wrong for the Iwerne camp people to allow Fletcher to attend camps, whilst he was barred from attending. (Makin report: 12.1.94)
We are left to join the dots ourselves as to the nature of this irony.
When it comes to Justin Welby's own position, there are growing calls for his resignation, including from one diocesan bishop who felt compelled to speak out following the repercussions of
another high profile safeguarding failure. He has said that he has considered his position and consulted colleagues, but will not resign. However, he may well bow to pressure in the coming days as that pressure mounts.
The first and principle issue is the extent to which Justin Welby failed in his own responsibilities with regard to the Smyth case. In this narrow view Makin lays some blows on Welby but there is no smoking gun. His failure did not extend to a breach of law or church policies or procedures. There was no evidence of any specific knowledge by Welby prior to 2013 of the allegations and following that, he was told that Ely Diocese was managing the case, that referral to the police had taken place and that the authorities in South Africa had been informed. The police must take some criticism from this report, as it emerges that five separate forces were consulted but none opened an active investigation until the Channel 4 news report in 2017.
Makin's report taken as a whole sets out a comprehensive failure of safeguarding policies, governance and processes, so there is a question whether the Archbishop should take ultimate accountability for that. This failure has been self-evidence for some time, most obviously with the ongoing voice of victims repeatedly saying that they are being re-traumatised by the Church and by the failure to establish an independent safeguarding body, as recommended by Alexis Jay in
her report into how to strengthen safeguarding in the Church of England, published in February.
Questions have also been asked how credible it is that Welby genuinely knew nothing before 2013, given how closely he was involved with that wing of the church and the fact that it increasingly became an 'open secret'. He attended Iwirne camps and knew Smyth, yet appears not to have heard the gossip from other camp members. He shared a flat with Mark Ruston who compiled a detailed report in 1982 into Smyth's abuse but they appear not to have discussed it. Discussions were held and correspondence shared with a large number of conservative evangelical leaders at a number of major churches and parachurch organisations, yet Justin Welby doesn't seem to have been included or have heard the reports second hand. Still, Makin has not raised this or accused Welby of knowing more than he has let on, so Mouse is not convinced this is grounds for resignation.
It strikes Mouse that there is also another body with responsibility for safeguarding which should not escape scrutiny. The remit of the Makin report does not extend as far, but the body ultimately responsible for safeguarding in the Church of England is Archbishops' Council. That is the body responsible for establishing the right governance, appointing individuals to roles and resourcing safeguarding adequately at a national level. It is Archbishops' Council which established an Independent Safeguarding Board in 2021 to hold the Church to account, then disbanded it and sacked its board members in 2023, with a lessons learned review undertaken
into the collapse of that body. No replacement has yet been established. Makin does not address the role of Archbishops' Council, as it is not involved with individual cases, but if the lesson we are seeking to learn is how to change the culture, structures, governance and policies, then Archbishops' Council comes squarely into focus.
We remain in the status of having lessons learned reports and independent reviews piling on top of each other while we mismanage support for victims and the establishment of independent oversight.
For what it is worth, Mouse is not convinced that the defenestration of the Archbishop is the answer, but Justin may well take another view if he decides that he has not been able to drive through the changes necessary and someone else should have a go.
Update:
It is impeccable timing that meant this blog post went live around 30 minutes before Justin Welby announced that he will be standing down. Mouse will provide more thoughts in due course on that, but Justin's statement can be read here.